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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
result in a reversal: "We do not think the evidence preponderates
against the findings, and they will not be disturbed."2
THOMAS J. BRENNAN
Conditional Sales Contracts-Election of Remedies by Vendor. In Washington Coop-
erative Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wn.2d 460, 256 P.2d 294 (1953), a conditional
vendor brought an action against third parties who, with knowledge of the condi-
tional sales contract, purchased the conditionally sold property from the conditional
vendor. The plaintiff had commenced, a previous action against the conditional
vendee to recover the purchase price, but the action had been dismissed, without
prejudice, before final judgment. Held, the mere commencement of the action con-
stituted an irrevocable election by the conditional vendor.
Conditional Sales Contracts-Continued Use by Vendee-Waiver of Rescission.
Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 143 Wash. Dec. 570, 262 P.2d 772 (1953), was an
action to recover the amount due on a contract for converting the defendant's heating
plant from gas to oil. The defendant had given notice of rescission on the grounds
of fraud, but continued to use the heating equipment. The court held that the con-
tinued use did not constitute a waiver or abandonment of the rescission. An
attempted rescission will not be defeated if the property was used merely in
compliance with the purchaser's duty as bailee of the seller, and not for the pur-
chaser's personal beneht. The expense of dismantling, removal, and storage of the
heating system "would have more than offset deterioration resulting from continued
use of the installation until such time as the seller performed his duty of re-
moving it."
Defective Performance-Discharge of Seller by Voluntary Acceptance. Angeles
Gravel & Supply Co. v. Clallain County Hospital, 42 Wn.2d 827, 259 P.2d 366
(1953) was an action for the balance due for concrete sold by the plaintiffs. The
defendants claimed that there were shortages in the deliveries, though it appeared
that no very positive complaints were made while the pouring of the concrete was
in progress nor until some time thereafter. Held, the defendants were estopped to
raise the issue of shortage. The court was satisfied that the facts justified an
application of the theory of a discharge by voluntary acceptance of a defective
performance. The application of the rule was "motivated by considerations of fair
dealing between the parties and the necessity of the party claiming a shortage to
establish it in time so that defective performance can be remedied."
TAXATION
Inheritance Taxes-Insurance Proceeds . The insured was the owner
of life insurance policies the proceeds of which were payable to desig-
nated beneficaries, the wife and son of the insured. Prior to his death,
the insured assigned the policies with the consent of the beneficiaries
2 Madden v. Herzog, supra note 1. The other cases listed contain similar state-
ments. And see Judge Weaver's strong comment on this point in Peterson v. Schoon-
over, 42 Wn.2d 621, 257 P.2d 209 (1953). Similar is Eder v. Nelson, 143 Wash.
Dec. 495, 262 P.2d 180 (1953). These latter two are the only cases handed down in
1953 concerning Negotiable Instruments. Their value as precedent is considered to
warrant no more than footnote mention here.
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to a creditor as security for a debt. After his death the proceeds were
used to discharge the obligation of th6 insured. In In re Gufler's Estate,'
it was held that the proceeds were within the exemption allowed by
the statute and thus not taxable.' The court declared that "'Benefici-
ary' as that word is used in the insurance statute, means the person
or corporation to whom, according to the terms of the policy, the pro-
ceeds are payable on the death of the insured."' The use to which the
proceeds are put does not determine their taxability.1
The legislative intent would seem to indicate that the general policy
of the state is to include life insurance proceeds as part of the estate
of the deceased insured. Prior to 1935, the statute provided that life
insurance proceeds paid to beneficiaries except the estate of the de-
ceased insured were exempt.' Immediately after the decision in the
Kilien case,' the statute was amended to provide that "Insurance
payable upon the death of any person shall be deemed a part of the
estate for the purpose of computing the inheritance tax... Provided,
however, that there is exempt from the total amount of insurance,
regardless of the number of policies, the sum of forty thousand dollars
1143 Wash. Dec. 405, 261 P2d 434 (1953).
2 RCW 83.04.010: "All property ... which shall pass by... contract ... made
or intended to take effect in possession or in enjoyment after death of the grantor, or
donor, to any person in trust or otherwise,... shall ... be subject to a tax measured
by the full value of the entire property, after the payment of all debts owing by the
decedent at the time of his death. . .
RCW 83.16.080: "Insurance payable upon the death of any person shall be deemed
a part of the estate for the purpose of computing the inheritance tax . . . Provided,
however, That there is exempt from the total amount of insurance receivable by all
beneficiaries other than the executor, administrator or representative of the estate,
regardless of the number of policies, the sum of forty thousand dollars and no more .....
In re Killien's Estate, 178 Wash. 335, 35 P2d 11 (1934). In this case the policies
of life insurance were made payable to a trustee who was also designated as the
executor of the estate of the insured under his will. The trust agreement provided
that the trustee was to collect, invest, and pay the proceeds to the insured's children.
The supervisor contended that the proceeds were not within the exemption allowed
by the law then in effect. L. 1929, c. 135, § provided that ". . the proceeds of all
life insurance policies, hereafter or heretofore paid to beneficiaries, except where the
estate of the deceased insured, is the beneficiary, shall be exempt from inheritance
tax. .... " The court after defining the term 'beneficiary' as referred to in the text,
went on to say "the term 'beneficiary' has no other meaning, so far as the question
here involved, than the word 'payee' applied to other kinds of contracts." (emphasis
supplied).
'The present federal statute, I.R.C. § 811 (g) contains no exemption. Interpre-
tations of a former federal statute, Internal Revenue Act of 1926, § 302 (g), as
amended, similar to the present Washington statute, appear to be contrary to the
holding in the Gufler case. Insurance proceeds, which are required to be used and
are used to satisfy debts of the decedent or his estate although payable to a beneficiary
other than the estate, are to be treated for the purposes of the Federal estate tax as
receivable by the executor, and are includible in the value of the decedent's gross
estate. U.S. Treas. Reg. 80.26 (1941) ; Estate of Silas B. Mason v. C.I.R., 40 B.T.A.
128 (1939) ; Morton v. C.I.R., 23 B.T.A. 236 (1931).
5L. 1929, c. 135, § 1.
6 Note 3, supra.
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and no more..... In 1939, the legislature limited the exemption to
apply only when the proceeds were received by beneficiaries other than
the executor, administrator or representative of the estate.8
It is a general rule of statutory construction that exemptions are to
be construed strictly." The policy of the state has been to allow an
exemption to encourage the development of insurance for the protection
of dependents."° Does the transaction in the instant case fall within
the purview of that policy? The court stated that the evident intent
of the legislature was to exempt life insurance proceeds, when received
by the beneficiaries other than the executor, administrator or repre-
sentative of the estate, regardless of the ultimate use or destination of
the funds. But was it the legislative intent to exempt life insurance
proceeds which were used to pay off the debts of the decedent even
though such proceeds were not "received" by the designated bene-
ficiaries? What was the nature of the beneficiaries' interest in the
policies upon the death of the insured as a result of the assignment?
These questions would seem to embody the controlling factors, but
they were given no consideration by the court.
Literally construed the words of the statute may support the con-
clusion reached in the Gufler case. Assume however, that the decedent
takes out a life insurance policy, and subsequently names the creditor
as the beneficiary at the time he borrows the money. The insured dies
and the insurance proceeds are used to discharge the debt. Does the
Gufler case mean that the proceeds are excluded, and that the debt is
deductible? Logically that is what the conclusion should be. As a
practical matter, however, there is no difference between naming the
creditor directly as a beneficiary, and naming another but by an assign-
ment which is joined in by the insured and the named beneficiaries to
pledge the policy to the creditor." In either case a debt is being dis-
7 L. 1935, c. 180, § 115.
8 L. 1939, c. 202, § 5.
9 Miethke v. Pierce County, 173 Wash. 381, 23 P.2d 405 (1933) ; In Re Ferrel's
Estate, 112 Wash. 231, 192 Pac. 10 (1920).
10 In re Killien's Estate, note 3, supra.
1' Estate of Mathews v. C.I.R., 3 T.C. 525 (1944), involved an assignment similar
in terms to the one in the Gufler case (see copy of assignment attached to brief of
Supervisor). The beneficiary contended that a right of subrogation existed. The Tax
Court declared that "on the evidence in this case we think that the assignment to the
creditor bank amounted to a conveyance of a property right in the policies to the
extent of the indebtedness to the bank at the time of his death. To that extent
the transfer was as effective as if the decedent in the exercise of his reserved power
to change the beneficiary at any time had named the creditor bank beneficiary of the
policies .... But even if it should be conceded that the beneficiary had a valid claim
against decedent's estate by right of subrogation or otherwise for the amount of the
proceeds of the policies it would not follow that the portion of the proceeds was not
I MAY
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charged on behalf of the estate. Upon the death of the insured, the
executor takes the place of the decedent. The executor has the duty
of taking charge of the assets and discharging all the debts before he
distributes the residue. When the insured with the consent of the
beneficiaries assigned the proceeds, he took complete control of the
property interest in the policy and directed the discharge of his obliga-
tions. The fact that no change was made 'in the beneficiaries designated
on the policies would not detract from this. For all practical puroses
it was exactly as though he had named his executor as beneficiary and
assigned the policy to the creditor as security. It seems that unless
one adheres to the literal wording of the statute and disregards the
substance and effect of the actions of the insured and the designated
beneficiaries, the assignment made the proceeds payable to "the execu-
tor, administrator, or representative of the estate," within the meaning
and intent of the Washington inheritance tax statute.
Inheritance Taxes-Property Previously Exempted. In In re
Gagan's Estate," the first decedent owned insurance policies the pro-
ceeds of which were payable to his wife, the present decedent. The
proceeds were not included in the estate of the first decedent in com-
puting the inheritance tax because they were within the statutory
exemption."' The present decedent bequeathed the proceeds to her
two children who now claim that such proceeds are exempt from taxa-
tion as property previously taxed.1'
'receivable by or for the benefit of the estate' within the meaning of the commissioner's
regulations." See also Estate. of Hofferbert v. C.I.R., 46 B.T.A. 1101 (1942).
In Estate of Max Reinhold v. C.I.R., 1944 P-H BTA-TC Mene. Dec. 44,093, it
appeared that the beneficiary had recovered by right of subrogation the amount of the
proceeds paid from the policies assigned. The court in referring to the proceeds applied
on the debt declared that "they are as much a part of the gross estate as the debt is a
deduction from the gross estate. One counterbalances the other. Fannie Reinhold did
not receive from the insurance company the $6,237.08, which was applied to satisfy the
indebtedness of Max Reinhold to the Grace National Bank. What her estate
recovered from the estate of her husband was not the proceeds from insurance policies.
Therefore they are not excludible from the gross estate of Max Reinhold."
12 42 Wn. 2d 520, 256 P 2d 836 (1953).
's RCW 83.16.080: "Insurance payable upon the death of any person shall be
deemed a part of the estate for the purpose of computing the inheritance tax and shall
be taxable to the person entitled therto... Provided, That there is exempt from the
total amount of insurance receivable by all the beneficiaries other than the estate,
regardless of the number of policies, the sum of forty thousand dollars and no more.."
24 L. 1939, c. 202, § 2: "There shall be exempt an amount equal to the value of any
property forming a part of the estate of any husband, wife, lineal descendant,.
who died within five years prior to the death of the decedent where such property
now passes from the decedent to any member of the same class: Proided, That this
exemption only applies to transfers upon which an inheritance tax was paid in the
estate of the first decedent. .. " Amended, L. 1953, c. 137, § 1. (with the exception of
a change in the members of the class, this particular provision remains substantially
the same). RCW 83.16.070.
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The probate court, on the authority of In re Johanson's Estate,"
concluded that the proceeds passing to the present decedent had been
taxed in the estate of the husband and were exempt from being taxed
as passing to the children. The supreme court set aside a portion of
the order approving the final report and decree of distribution with
the instruction to recompute the tax, and declared that the reasoning
for the holding in the Johanson case, supra, did not apply to exempt
insurance proceeds.
In the Johanson case, the state claimed that the amount listed as
an exemption in the estate of the second decedent should have been
reduced by the amount of the exemption allowed to Class A bene-
ficiaries in the estate of the first decedent. The court, however, held
that the entire amount of the estate, including the exemptions was
considered in determining the amount of the tax for each bracket in
Class A and thus no portion of the estate had escaped taxation.
The effect of the decision in the Johanson case would seem to have
been abrogated by the recent statutory enactment16 which provides
that "the proportion of deduction chargeable against and any exemp-
tion allowed against the property previously taxed in the estate of the
prior decedent" must be excluded from that portion of the property
previously taxed. In the Gagan case the court declared that the exemp-
tion allowed to the estate of the first decedent had no part in deter-
mining the amount of inheritance tax. The court thus reached a result
intended by the subsequent 1953 amendment.'
GUST A. LEDAKIS
TORTS
Wanton Misconduct-Contributory Negligence not a Defense.
Contributory negligence is not a defense to wanton misconduct. The
first clear statement of this rule in Washington was pronounced recently
in Adkinson v. Seattle.' The defendant, in the course of sewer and
water main construction, left, on a highway, a pile of dirt three to six
feet high which entirely covered one side of the heavily traveled
arterial, with no barriers and no more than three flare pots, on a dark
and rainy night. The plantiff's decedent was speeding when he struck it.
Wanton misconduct is a middle ground between wilful misconduct
and negligence. A wanton act is one performed with a reckless in-
1538 Wn. 2d 492, 230 P. 2d 614 (1951).
16 L. 1953, c. 137, § 1. See Harsch, Taxation, 28 WAsH. L. REV. 197 (1953).
17 Supra, note 16.
1 42 Wn.2d 676, 258 P.2d 461 (1953).
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